Chapter 65438 +0 Complete Information Static Game
1. 1 Basic Theory: Standard Form of Game and Nash Equilibrium
The standard expression of 1. 1 Give full play to
1. 1.b Repeatedly eliminate the strictly inferior strategy.
The derivation and definition of 1. 1 Nash equilibrium
Application example of 1.2
Cournot duopoly model
1.2.B Bertrand's duopoly model
1.2.C final asking price arbitration
1.2.D Public * * * Financial Issues
The development of 1.3 theory: the existence of mixed strategy and equilibrium
1.3. Mixed strategy
Existence of 1.3.B Nash Equilibrium
1.4 Further reading
1.5 exercises and exercises
1.6 reference
Chapter II Dynamic Game with Complete Information
2. 1 perfect information dynamic game
2. 1. A theory: backward induction
2. 1. Stackelberg duopoly model
2.1.C. Wages and employment in enterprises with trade unions
2. 1. Sequential negotiation
2.2 Two-stage game with completely incomplete information
2.2. Theory: Subgame refinement
2.2.B's squeeze on banks
2.2.C Tariffs and imperfect competition in the international market
2.2.D Work Competition
2.3 Repeated game
2.3.A Theory: Two-stage Repeated Game
2.3.B Theory: Infinitely Repeated Game
2.3.C Cournot * * diagram under duopoly
2.3.D Efficiency pay
2.3.E Time-consistent monetary policy