After the founding of the People's Republic of China in October 1949, as the Communist Party of China and New China implemented a "one-sided" foreign policy, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet government also Expressing clear support for New China, the two parties and countries of China and the Soviet Union launched extensive cooperation, and Sino-Soviet relations entered a new stage of friendly cooperation later known as the "honeymoon period." From December 1949 to February 1950, Chairman Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai, the leaders of New China, visited the Soviet Union and held talks with Soviet leader Stalin. During this period, China and the Soviet Union signed the "Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance" and the "Agreement on the China Changchun Railway, Lushunkou and Dalian", formally forming an alliance. Since then, the economic and trade relations between the two countries have developed rapidly. From 1950 to 1957, the Soviet Union provided large-scale assistance to the economic and cultural construction of New China, the most prominent of which was assisting China in the construction of 156 key construction projects. China and the Soviet Union also cooperated closely in the military and diplomatic fields, and jointly opposed the US aggression against North Korea, etc.
This "honeymoon period"-like Sino-Soviet relationship lasted for several years. Although major events such as the death of Stalin and the emergence of new leaders occurred in the Soviet Union during this period, they did not have an impact on the friendly cooperative relations between China and the Soviet Union. In line with the political, economic, military and cultural relations of the "honeymoon period", the two parties and countries of China and the Soviet Union also maintained a "high degree of consistency" in terms of ideology, and there were almost no "differences". Both sides are guided by Marxism-Leninism, pursue the ideology of socialism and communism, speak with one voice internationally, and adopt the same line and policy. Although there were "contradictions" and "frictions" between China and the Soviet Union during the "honeymoon period", they only involved some specific issues encountered in the process of dealing with bilateral relations, as well as theoretical, line, policy and ideological issues. It has nothing to do with it; although the leaders of the two countries have complained about each other in private, they have never raised their "complaints" to the level of "ideological differences", let alone publicly criticized each other. It is particularly worth mentioning that although Mao Zedong later criticized Stalin many times for his great-power chauvinism and criticized some of Stalin's views and practices as "not in line with Marxism", etc., while Stalin was still alive, China's leaders never Mao Zedong and others have never said this, whether in public or within the Communist Party of China. Actually, this is not surprising. In the process of leading the Chinese revolution, the Communist Party of China received guidance and assistance from the Soviet party and government and Stalin. Therefore, Chinese Communists including Mao Zedong have always claimed to be Stalin's students. At the beginning of the founding of New China, although the Communist Party of China achieved revolutionary victory, it lacked experience in socialist construction and had to continue to learn from the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union, and had to continue to obtain guidance and help from Stalin. Because of this, among the Chinese Communists at that time, as in the past, there was a certain degree of superstition about the Communist Party of China, the Soviet Union and Stalin. In their minds, Stalin was the mentor and leader of the international communist movement after Lenin, and the theoretical authority of Marxism-Leninism; the Soviet Union was the party created by Lenin and led by Stalin, and was the representative of all communist parties in various countries. was the leader, and the Soviet Union was the model for all socialist countries. In this case, the Communist Party of China and China can only follow the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union closely, and can only continue to accept Stalin's guidance and help. It is impossible and dare not have any doubts about the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union, and Stalin. Even if we are dissatisfied with some specific practices of the Soviet Union, we cannot and dare not doubt the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union, and Stalin in terms of theory, line, and policies. In a sense, the "complete ideological agreement" between China and the Soviet Union during the "honeymoon period" was actually the result of the Chinese Communist Party and New China's efforts to "keep up" with the Soviet Communist Party and the Soviet Union.
However, although the "honeymoon relationship" and "complete consistency" in ideology between China and the Soviet Union lasted for a period of time, they could not last long. As time goes by and circumstances change, Sino-Soviet relations will inevitably change. Sure enough, starting from the beginning of 1956, the situation of "complete ideological consistency" was first affected. Later, the "honeymoon relationship" between China and the Soviet Union gradually began to shake.
The ideological differences between China and the Soviet Union were initially caused by the 20th Congress of the Soviet Union.
At the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union held in February 1956, the new leader of the Soviet Union, Khrushchev, made a secret report "On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences", sharply criticizing He recognized Stalin's serious mistakes and put forward in the congress' summary report the view that capitalism could peacefully transition to socialism through the "parliamentary road". (Note: See "The Origin and Development of the Differences between the Leaders of the Soviet Union and Us - A Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the Soviet Union", People's Daily, September 6, 1963.) This unusual approach is not only It had great repercussions not only in the Soviet Union but also in China and around the world. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and Mao Zedong attached great importance to it after learning of Khrushchev's secret report, and immediately convened several Politburo Standing Committee meetings to discuss the matter. The results of the discussion showed that the initial reaction of Chinese leaders was complicated. Mao Zedong believed that the mistakes made by Khrushchev and the 20th Congress of the Soviet Union in criticizing Stalin not only "lifted the lid" but also "poked a loophole." Mao Zedong said: "To say that he lifted the lid is to say that his secret report showed that not everything in the Soviet Union, Soviet Union, and Stalin was correct, which dispelled superstition. To say that he poked a loophole is to say, This secret report he made contained serious errors both in content and method." (Note: Wu Lengxi: "Remembering Chairman Mao", Xinhua Publishing House, February 1995, pp. 4-5.) In short, Mao Zedong and other leaders of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China did not object to Khrushchev's criticism of Stalin's mistakes on the one hand. They even believed that doing so would be of great benefit and liberated the minds of communists in various countries. On the other hand, they They believe that Khrushchev's approach has shortcomings, that is, criticizing important figures like Stalin for carrying out a surprise attack without consulting the fraternal parties in advance; beating Stalin to death with a stick, or in other words, completely denying Stalin and only talking about his mistakes and not his achievements. . (Note: Wu Lengxi: "Remembering Chairman Mao", Xinhua Publishing House, February 1995 edition, pages 6-7.) This shows that starting from the issue of how to treat Stalin, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China does not fully agree The views and practices of the Soviet Union Central Committee have their own opinions. Differences arose between China and the Soviet Union, breaking the past situation of "complete agreement" on major issues of principle. What is even more noteworthy is that the leaders of the Communist Party of China not only criticized the actions of the Soviet Union internally, but also wrote and published two articles: "On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" and "Reconsideration of the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" The article was the first time that although it was tactful, it publicly expressed opinions different from those of Su ***. In addition to the differences between the two sides on the Stalin issue, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China also disapproved of the "peaceful transition" theory proposed at the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, believing that it violated the Marxist-Leninist principle of violent revolution. However, in the first year, Mao Zedong and others did not argue with the leaders of the Soviet Union on the issue of "peaceful transition", nor did they publicly publish articles criticizing Khrushchev's views until the Moscow Conference in November 1957. When the meeting was held, because the issue of peaceful transition was again mentioned in the "Declaration" drafted by Soviet Union, the Chinese party and government delegation led by Mao Zedong reiterated their different views in the internal discussion of the meeting and asked Soviet Union to agree to amend it. Views on the Draft Declaration.
Soon thereafter, in addition to the two major differences mentioned above, there were new developments in the ideological differences between China and the Soviet Union. Due to the indirect influence of the 20th Congress of the Soviet Union. Incidents occurred in Poland and Hungary in 1956. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China was also not very satisfied with the handling of the Polish-Hungarian incident by the Central Committee of the Soviet Union and put forward its own different views. Therefore, it criticized the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Soviet Union for their improper handling of relations between fraternal parties and countries. The mistakes of great power chauvinism and so on. However, relatively speaking, before 1957, the differences between China and the Soviet Union on other issues were not as important and eye-catching as the Stalin issue and the peaceful transition issue.
After the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, major differences arose between China and the Soviet Union. The previous "complete agreement" situation changed. This is of course not accidental. In the author's opinion, there are at least the following important reasons: First, the two parties have different experiences, lack of understanding of each other, and have different starting points for looking at the problem, so disagreements are inevitable.
Take the Stalin issue as an example. Regardless of whether Khrushchev’s approach was completely correct or not, he was based on the situation and needs of the Soviet Union, including Khrushchev’s own political needs. However, Chinese leaders were very concerned about Stalin’s political needs. They don’t know the inside story very well, they have no personal experience with the serious consequences of Stalin’s mistakes, and they mainly consider the issue from the needs of international communism and China. Naturally, their views are not exactly the same as those of the Soviet side. . Second, the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Union and Khrushchev's exposure and criticism of Stalin's mistakes ruthlessly shattered the myth that Stalin was always wise and correct, shattered the myth that the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union were perfect, and also weakened Stalin. , the Soviet Union, and the long-term supremacy and superiority of the Soviet Union, it eliminated superstition and liberated the minds of communists around the world, including Chinese Communists, not only allowing them to dare to doubt the Soviet Union The *Soviet Union also dared to express opinions that were different from those of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union. Before the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, especially during Stalin's rule, this situation was impossible. Third, after several years of practice and development in the early years of the founding of the People's Republic of China, New China has gradually grown stronger, and the leaders of the Communist Party of China have also gained certain experience, especially in how to carry out construction, and gradually have their own views. In addition, after Stalin's death, the Soviet Union The new leaders who came to power, including Khrushchev, cannot compare with Mao Zedong and others in terms of qualifications, prestige, experience, etc. This has greatly enhanced the self-confidence of Mao Zedong and other Chinese leaders, and they no longer need to do what they did in the past. Be very cautious in front of the Soviet Union and Soviet leaders. This was most vividly reflected in Mao Zedong's different moods, the different treatments he received when he visited Moscow in 1949 and 1957, and his different behaviors.
From today's perspective, the differences between the Chinese and Soviet parties after the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China were not only well-reasoned and completely understandable, but also not a bad thing in itself. At the very least, disagreement is normal, but "perfect agreement" like the "honeymoon period" is not. More importantly, as long as both parties handle it properly, ideological differences do not necessarily have a negative impact on existing friendly and cooperative relations. This has been proven by the facts in 1956-1957.
Pragmatically speaking, in the more than two years before the summer of 1958, although the Chinese and Soviet parties had major differences on issues such as Stalin, peaceful transition, and relations between fraternal parties and fraternal countries, the two parties continued to Disputes arose, but Sino-Soviet relations not only did not regress, but even developed into new ones, becoming closer than before 1955. During this period, not only did the two sides continue to carry out friendly cooperation, but the Soviet Union also increased its assistance to China. An outstanding manifestation is that because the Soviet Union promised to help China in the development of missile and nuclear weapons and agreed to provide China with atomic bomb samples, China and the Soviet Union signed the "New Defense Technology Agreement" in October 1957. There are certainly reasons why the ideological differences at that time did not reverse Sino-Soviet relations. The author believes that firstly, there are not many differences and arguments between the two sides, and they are limited to the scope of general theoretical issues and do not directly involve each other's national interests; secondly, in the arguments, the Chinese side mainly criticizes the Soviet side, while Khrushchev Because their foothold is not stable and they are in a lot of troubles, they especially need the support of Chinese leaders, so they have to be patient with China's criticism; third, China also needs economic and military assistance from the Soviet Union, and hopes to continue to maintain the overall situation of Sino-Soviet friendly cooperation. Therefore, when criticizing the Soviet side, the attitude and method used were relatively cautious, and there was no intention or approach to anger the Soviet side, so that the debate could generally be carried out in a calm atmosphere. It can be seen that as long as it is handled properly, there is no inevitable connection between ideological differences and the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations.
(2)
Although the ideological differences between China and the Soviet Union did not damage the relationship between the two parties in the more than two years after the 20th National Congress of the Soviet Union, they have never Starting from the summer of 1958, Sino-Soviet relations began to reverse and gradually deteriorated. It is true that the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations cannot be entirely attributed to ideological differences, but it is undeniable that ideological differences also played a considerable role in exacerbating the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations.
What needs to be carefully studied is how ideological differences exacerbated the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations after the summer of 1958.
The author believes that, generally speaking, the reason why ideological differences began to damage Sino-Soviet relations after the summer of 1958 was because other new disputes emerged between China and the Soviet Union, which further expanded ideological differences. And it was intertwined with other disputes, and both parties adopted the wrong attitude towards the differences and disputes. This is mainly reflected in the following aspects:
First, starting from the summer of 1958, China and the Soviet Union clashed on many issues involving national interests. The more conflicts there are, and the various differences and disputes are intertwined, making the seemingly insignificant ideological differences suddenly become more serious, more complex, and more destructive.
In international exchanges, any country must undoubtedly proceed from its own national interests and safeguard its own national interests, and China and the Soviet Union are no exception. However, during the "honeymoon period", since the two sides basically followed the principle of "equality and mutual benefit" and did not do anything that harmed the national interests of the other party, although the two sides had "frictions" on some small issues, there were no major issues. What a dispute. However, starting from the summer of 1958, the situation changed, and China and the Soviet Union clashed on a series of issues involving national interests. The initial disturbance was the long-wave radio and joint submarine fleet incidents that took place that summer. Out of its own needs, the Soviet Union took advantage of China's desire to get Soviet help in building submarines and proposed that both parties cooperate to build a long-wave radio station and a joint submarine fleet in China. However, China believes that this is an excuse for the Soviet Union to help China, but it actually violates China's sovereignty and has an attempt to control China. The two sides have been at loggerheads for months. Mao Zedong was furious, and Khrushchev hurriedly flew to Beijing to defend the Soviet Union. Although the matter was later settled, bad feelings grew between the two parties from then on. Then, in August of that year, another dispute broke out over the Taiwan Strait issue. In order to attack the Chiang Kai-shek clique and warn the United States not to interfere in China's internal affairs, China launched the bombardment of Kinmen and Matsu without consulting the Soviet side. Although the Soviet Union expressed its support for China and opposition to the United States on the surface, it was worried that the bombardment of Kinmen and Matsu would cause The United States' armed intervention dragged the Soviet Union into the US-Soviet War. Therefore, it was actually dissatisfied with China. It then unilaterally tore up the "National Defense New Technology Agreement" signed in October 1957 and withdrew its commitment to provide atomic bomb samples to China. In 1959, in order to safeguard its territorial sovereignty and oppose India's provocation on the Sino-Indian border, China adopted self-defense measures. However, the Soviet Union believed that the armed conflict on the Sino-Indian border was not conducive to the detente between the Soviet Union and the United States and destroyed the peaceful atmosphere of Khrushchev's visit to the United States. Therefore, it ignored China's repeated objections and publicly issued a statement in support of India. In addition, the Soviet Union was also dissatisfied with China's launch of the Great Leap Forward and the People's Commune Movement, while China criticized Khrushchev's enthusiasm for building relations with the United States, and so on. Obviously, the above disputes involve each other's national interests. Generally speaking, in international relations, the conflict of national interests will inevitably affect the quality of mutual relations. Therefore, the conflict of national interests between China and the Soviet Union will also inevitably damage the relationship between the two parties. Even if there are no ideological differences, the relationship between China and the Soviet Union will not be the same. A reversal will occur. However, unlike general international relations, there were not only national interest issues but also ideological issues between China and the Soviet Union, and the two were always inevitably intertwined, which made the problem more complicated. More serious.
That is exactly what happened. From a general perspective, the disputes between China and the Soviet Union in terms of national interests caused dissatisfaction and ill-feeling between China and the Soviet Union, and intensified mutual distrust. All parties began to doubt the motives of the other party, and even believed that the other party had ulterior motives. Both China and the Soviet Union are countries that pay attention to ideology. When there are more and more problems, all parties must look for the causes in terms of ideology and dig out the roots in terms of theory, line, and policy. It was precisely because of the emergence of the above disputes that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and Mao Zedong began to suspect that the Central Committee of the Soviet Union and Khrushchev had violated Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism on many issues, and then made the judgment that Khrushchev Xiaofu and others have embarked on the path of revisionism or semi-revisionism.
Mao Zedong and others felt that if there had not been problems in theory and line, how could Khrushchev have done so many things that harmed socialist China? ! At the same time, the Central Committee of the Soviet Union and Khrushchev were also thinking that there must be something wrong with the theories and lines of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and Mao Zedong. They had deviated from the principles of Marxism-Leninism and committed dogmatism and adventurism. Errors etc. It can be seen that the conflict of national interests actually promotes the escalation of ideological differences. Looking at some of the specific issues in the above-mentioned disputes, some issues involve both national interests and ideology. For example, the different evaluations of the Great Leap Forward and the People's Commune Movement launched by China involve the theoretical line and political issues of how to build socialism and communism. Another example is the attitude towards the United States, which is both a diplomatic issue and a theoretical issue. When China opposed détente between the Soviet Union and the United States, the important reason it raised was that the nature of imperialism had not changed. Imperialism was the root of war and could not truly love peace. Therefore, Khrushchev was keen to please U.S. imperialism and beautify imperialism. leaders, etc. are all against Marxism-Leninism. As a result, the ideological differences between China and the Soviet Union further expanded along with the conflict of national interests, greatly exceeding the scope before 1958.
What is more noteworthy is that on the one hand, the conflict of national interests promotes the expansion and escalation of ideological differences; on the other hand, in turn, the sharpening of ideological differences intensifies the conflict of national interests. This became even more obvious after 1960. When Khrushchev besieged China at the Bucharest Conference in June 1960 in an attempt to subdue China, he took further action, tearing up all contracts and agreements to assist China, and withdrawing all aid to construction projects in China. Soviet experts, thus causing a greater conflict of national interests between China and the Soviet Union. In 1963, also in order to attack and retaliate against China in the public ideological debate, the Soviet Union changed its position that it had always insisted on in the past and decided to sign a partial nuclear test ban treaty with the United States and the United Kingdom to prevent China from possessing nuclear weapons, which made China very angry. Finally decided to part ways with the Soviet Union. These examples all show that when conflicts of national interests and ideological differences are intertwined, they will cause and effect each other and promote each other, making the differences and disputes more and more serious and out of control, eventually leading to the deterioration and deterioration of the relationship between the two parties. rupture.
Second, in the face of the expansion of ideological differences, both China and the Soviet Union changed their previous cautious, matter-of-fact and calm approach, and adopted self-righteous, stubborn, imposing, uncompromising, and unlimited Shang Gang's arbitrary attitude caused the dispute to fall into a vicious cycle of constant retaliation and counter-retaliation, which irreparably aggravated the deterioration and breakdown of the relationship between the two parties.
Although China and the Soviet Union had different views on some major issues after the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, and the views of both sides were not necessarily correct at the time, as mentioned above, the two sides treated Relatively speaking, the approach to disagreements is relatively cautious, and they basically discuss the matter on a case-by-case basis. Although they argue and criticize each other internally, they should be calm and not impose themselves on others. However, after the summer of 1958, due to the conflict of national interests and the expansion of ideological differences, both sides began to become uncool and arbitrary.
This is mainly manifested in the following aspects: First, self-righteousness and stubbornness. In the face of differences, both parties believe that their own views are truly in line with Marxism-Leninism, while the other side is wrong and violates Marxism-Leninism. In arguments, both parties insist on their own opinions and always criticize the other party, but do not pay attention to consider whether the other party's opinions are reasonable, let alone make self-criticism. The second is to impose on others without compromise. Both sides claimed that they had the desire to eliminate their differences. However, in internal talks after internal discussions and in published articles one after another, both sides insisted that their own views were the most correct, claiming that the other party would only accept their own views and admit their differences. And by correcting mistakes, differences can be eliminated. As a result, so-called negotiations and discussions become criticism of the other party. Both sides described the other's criticism as an "attack." The Soviet side accused China of being "anti-Soviet," while the Chinese side accused the Soviet side of being "anti-China." What's worse is that in the debate, both sides adopt the approach of "finding fault with each other" and "settling old scores" in an attempt to defeat the other party. Obviously their views are very close, but the formulation is different. However, the two sides do not "seek common ground while reserving differences", but "abandon common ground and seek differences", insisting on finding so-called "principle differences" and making a big fuss. To settle old scores in history means to rehash past disputes in order to rebuke the other party.
In fact, the matter has long since passed, and the result of doing so will only increase each other's bad feelings. The third is the infinite outline. The differences were originally very specific and involved each specific content. It could have been possible to distinguish "right from wrong" through specific analysis, that is, to adopt the so-called "discussing the matter based on the facts." However, as the differences expanded, both sides changed their attitudes and adopted an "infinite overriding policy" to base every disagreement on whether it conforms to the principles of Marxism-Leninism, Marxism-Leninism, revisionism, and opportunity. the height of the struggle over the communist line. China believes that the Soviet Union has implemented an out-and-out revisionist line, and that Khrushchev is a "traitor" who betrayed Marxism, the proletarian revolution and the proletarian dictatorship, and implemented capitalist restoration in the Soviet Union, etc. etc.; and the Soviet side also added a lot of labels to China, such as dogmatism, adventurism, Trotskyism, etc. In short, the labels are flying all over the sky, and the standards are getting higher and higher. It is true that the differences between the two parties cannot be said to have no "right and wrong", nor can it be said that "right and wrong" cannot be distinguished through discussion. However, what is "truth" cannot be determined by one's own words, nor can it be proved by "quoting scriptures". It cannot be judged by imposing it on others or by unlimited general guidelines, but can only be tested by practice and history. Practice and history have proven that many of the views that both sides thought were correct were actually incorrect, and many of the views held by both sides in the dispute could not stand the test of history. As Deng Xiaoping said: "After more than twenty years of practice, Looking back, both sides talked a lot of empty words." (Note: "Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping", Volume 3, People's Publishing House, October 1993, page 291.) Fourth, they continued to engage in retaliation and counter-retaliation. In the dispute, both sides accuse the other party of instigating the dispute in the first place. Therefore, their side is only "self-defense and counterattack" and is only exercising its "right to reply to the other party's attacks." In fact, it is constantly retaliating and counter-retaliating, and the result is bound to be vicious. In the cycle, no one is willing to give in, and they even think that giving in means "surrendering" or "giving in" to the other party. Such a "cycle" can only lead to more and more differences, more and more sharp conflicts, and an increasingly tense atmosphere. The more nervous you are, the more serious the consequences will be.
Third, in order to finally defeat the other side in the ideological dispute, both sides adopted the practice of "open debate", which took the dispute to the extreme and became a fatal blow to Sino-Soviet relations.
As we all know, when the ideological dispute between China and the Soviet Union reached its peak, a large-scale "public debate" was adopted. To be honest, the occurrence of "open debate" is inevitable. Since both parties are stubborn and uncompromising as analyzed above, and they take the dispute so seriously, it will inevitably lead to "open debate." Generally speaking, when ideological differences arise between parties, countries, or even individuals, "open debate" may be adopted. "Open debate" cannot be completely denied. It is often said that "the truth becomes clearer with more debate", which is not unreasonable. However, the large-scale "public debate" that broke out between China and the Soviet Union in the early 1960s was extraordinary and should be discussed separately. First of all, the scale of the debate is unprecedented. Not only is it very rare in the history of the international communist movement, but it is also difficult to find precedents in human history. Secondly, both sides of the debate are unprecedented in history. Among the major parties and countries that have emerged, both have huge human, material and financial resources, hundreds of millions of supporters, and can use what can be called modern communication methods at the time, so their influence has spread all over the world; third, and more important The most important thing is that both sides insist on their own opinions. The opposition is serious, the contradiction is sharp, and the attitude is arrogant. It is also very rare in history. Although such a large-scale "public debate" was once jokingly called by Mao Zedong as just a "lawsuit of pen and ink", "the sky will not fall", "the trees will still grow", "the fish in the river will still swim", "it will not matter if the debate lasts for ten thousand years" ", (Note: Wu Lengxi: "Ten Years of Debate", Volume 2, Central Literature Publishing House, May 1999 edition, page 914.) However, because the attitudes of both parties are incorrect, the debate is not really reasonable, so Although the scale is large, the truth has not become clearer and clearer, and neither party has been defeated.
On the contrary, the great debate has muddied the originally murky waters and confused the minds of the people on both sides. Even because the great debate takes ideological differences as the main content, it has even reduced the substantive issue of conflict of national interests. The problem has been covered up; the big debate has turned into a big criticism, with the two sides scolding each other in newspapers, radio and radio. This will not produce any positive effect except making the antagonism between the two sides more serious, their mistakes deeper, and their unwillingness to compromise. It has been proven by history. In short, the public debate pushed the ideological dispute between the two sides to the extreme, which was undoubtedly a fatal blow to Sino-Soviet relations. After the great public debate, there was no other way for Sino-Soviet relations to go but to a complete breakdown.
It can be seen from the above analysis that the ideological differences between China and the Soviet Union did play a very important role in the deterioration and breakdown of relations between the two parties. The main reason for this is that ideological differences are intertwined with conflicts of national interests, and both parties have adopted incorrect attitudes towards differences and disputes. It must be pointed out that what the author said does not completely deny that differences and disputes also have "right" and "wrong", right and wrong, nor does it completely deny that some "struggles", such as the necessity and significance of China's fight against the Soviet Union's attempt to control China, But in terms of the main content of the ideological dispute and the main way of arguing between the two sides, it can be concluded that there is basically no positive significance. As for who should bear the greater responsibility in the dispute, China and the Soviet Union need to be analyzed in detail. However, this is not the question to be answered in this article and needs to be discussed in another article.
(3)
The ideological differences and debates between China and the Soviet Union and the harm they caused to the relationship between the two sides have left many important historical lessons to people, which are worthy of being taken seriously by future generations. Draw. Due to space limitations, this article can only briefly mention the author's preliminary views.
First, when dealing with relations between countries, national interests should be separated from ideology as much as possible, and ideological and social system factors should be discussed as much as possible.
Between different countries, there are both national interest issues and ideological issues. This is true whether the ideologies and social systems are basically the same or fundamentally different. Conflicts will occur. When dealing with relations between countries, safeguarding one's own national interests should be the top priority. This is basic and comes first. Although ideological differences and differences in social systems cannot be ignored, they are secondary after all and should be downplayed as much as possible. It is particularly noteworthy that disputes over national interests must not be confused with ideological differences. Otherwise, the mistakes of the deterioration and breakdown of Sino-Soviet relations may be repeated.
Second, regarding the ideological rights and wrongs of other parties and other countries, especially the theories, lines and policies proposed by other fraternal parties and countries, except those involving the national interests of one's own country and the political parties of other countries around the world. Those who share the same interests should be very cautious and not easily affirm or deny, nor make rash comments.
This is because each country has its own special national conditions, and the parties in each country always put forward their own theories, formulate their own lines and policies based on their own experience and their own national conditions, and explore them in practice. . Because other parties and countries have different experiences and experience, they do not understand the situation of these parties and countries very well, and it is difficult to understand the thoughts of these parties and countries. Therefore, they should not easily judge their rights and wrongs, let alone use their own so-called "principles" , "framework" to trap others, and point fingers at others. As Deng Xiaoping said: "Any big party, medium party, or small party must respect each other's choices and experiences, and respect other parties and other countries." "If they make mistakes, they should correct them themselves." (Note: "Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping", Volume 3, People's Publishing House, October 1993, page 236. )
Third, if there are indeed major principled differences involving both parties between fraternal parties and fraternal countries, and the right and wrong are relatively clear, and the correct party believes that it must persist, it should also adopt a reasonable attitude, Discuss with the other party, or make appropriate criticisms of the other party, and at the same time allow the other party to put forward or retain different opinions, "seek common ground while reserving differences" as much as possible, and should not impose on others, should not limit the outline, and try to avoid "open debates" ” way to resolve differences.