1. Araki Army: Infantry Regiment Command, Infantry 2 13 Wing (lack of 2nd Brigade), Mountain Gun 33 Wing, Main Force of Engineer 33 Wing, Independent Rapid Fire Gun 5 Squadron, Health Team. Advance along the left bank of Irrawaddy River, and first attack Magway south of yenangyaung.
2. Former Tian Jun: Infantry 2 15 Wing (short of 3 brigades), light armored motorcade, independent rapid-fire gunNo.1squadron, mountain artillery No.7 Squadron, independent mixed brigade artillery team No.2 1, and a squadron of field anti-aircraft gun No.5 1 brigade. Cover the left wing of the division and contain the enemy.
3. Workshop troops: infantry 2 14 wing (short of 1 brigade), mountain artillery 3 brigade, an engineering detachment, health team, etc. Concealed attempt to capture yenangyaung in one fell swoop and cut off the enemy's retreat.
4. Units directly under the division: division headquarters, infantry wing 1 brigade 2 14, and infantry wing 3 brigade 2 15. Follow Araki's troops.
In addition, the 26th Wing of Independent Engineers leapt along the Irrawaddy River, ready to deliver troops at any time. 1On April 3rd, 942, British troops began to destroy yenangyaung oil field. Admiral Alexander, commander-in-chief of the British-Burmese army, asked the China army to take over the British defense on the western front to cover the large-scale retreat of the British army. /Kloc-On the afternoon of 0/4, the British-Burmese Army 1 Division, the British-Indian Army 17 Division and the 7th Brigade of the Armored Army gave up the outer defense line of Magway, abandoned the slow-moving Araki troops and "calmly retreated" northward along the highway. However, due to the containment of Harada troops before, the British army failed to find the penetration of troops. On April 6th, 1942, the British-Burmese Army 1 Division first arrived in yenangyaung, and the British-Indian Army 17 Division and the 7th Brigade of Panzer Corps assembled in Wang Kebing, east of yenangyaung, and north of East Dunham Branch to Mao Na.
At noon on June 5th, 65438, Alexander ordered the full-scale blasting of yenangyaung Oilfield, and sent a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek, asking for reinforcements from China. Because the oil field blasting will not be completed until noon on 16, the assistance of China army is needed. At the request of General Alexander, Commander-in-Chief of the Expeditionary Force, General Luo ordered the teachers of the new 38th Division to move to Qiaokebaidang with a regiment (1 13, led by Liu) on June 5438+04 and June 5438+05 to support the British-Burmese 1 division. A regiment (1 12 regiment, headed by Chen Mingren) moved to Natmuk to support the British-Burmese 17 division to cover the right wing of the 5th Army. Note 4.
At midnight on April 1942 and 16, the workshop troops advanced to the east of yenangyaung, and found that the retreating British troops and tanks had retreated to the north (right) of Pinchong River, but 1 the British-Burmese military division headquarters and the troops directly under the division were still on the south bank. /kloc-in the early morning of 0/7, the soldiers in the workshop launched a surprise attack in two ways. 2 14 United 3rd Infantry Brigade (Gao Yan Brigade) crossed the border northward, defeated the British-Burmese Army 1 Division, captured about 80 people, occupied Kaimin, 7 kilometers away, and blocked Pinchong River Bridge; The main force of the temporary army suddenly broke through at the fork in the northeast corner, captured about 200 British and Burmese troops and cut off the road. According to the accounts of the prisoners of the British-Burmese Army, the main force of the British-Burmese Army 1 Division is still in the south and failed to pass yenangyaung's Note 5. Lin Wei, head of the Staff Committee of the Expeditionary Force, sent a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek from Lashou on April 1942, judging that the main force of the workshop was hundreds of people. However, according to the common sense of the Japanese army, an infantry wing (lacking a brigade) plus a mountain artillery brigade should be fully staffed with more than 3,000 people. Alexander, commander-in-chief of the British-Burmese army, saw that there was only one regiment of national reinforcements and asked for more troops. 17, Chiang Kai-shek called back and agreed to send the new 38th Division 1 12.
17 during the day, the workshop troops occupied the east, north and south of yenangyaung (the intersection of various roads) with 2 14 units directly under the United Front and 2 brigades of the United Front as the main resistance lines. In addition, the 3rd Battalion of Mountain Artillery (Zhongjing Battalion) is located near the fork in the center of yenangyaung Village, as a forward stronghold (pictured).
More than 1,000 British and Indian troops of the 13 brigade located on the north bank of Pinchong River attacked the Gao Yan brigade under the cover of 10 tanks and were repelled. /kloc-after dusk on 0/7, Gao Yan's request for night attack was rejected by colonel Zuo Zuo, and he ordered the 9th squadron to cover the north side, and the main brigade moved south, and was incorporated into the 3rd Battalion of Lieshan Artillery, under the command of Nakai Shin.
On the same day, the 1 12 Army of the National Army arrived in Mao Na outside yenangyaung. The 1 13 regiment, which had arrived in Chokeba the day before, was led by the head of the regiment, Liu, and arrived at the north bank of Pinchong River by bus at dusk and entered the attack position at midnight. 18 dawn, 1 13 Regiment 2 Battalion, supported by 12 British light chariot and 3 guns, launched an attack on the Japanese army on the north shore. Note 10. In the afternoon, the Japanese army was defeated, forcing the ninth squadron to retreat to the south of the river (note 1 1). The 3rd Battalion immediately crossed the river in pursuit, trying to annihilate the Japanese army, but it was stopped by the Japanese army (the ninth squadron) on the south (left) shore.
At the same time, 1 the first division of the British-Burmese army retreated from the south (according to the Japanese judgment, there are about 4,000 troops, 15 tanks, 15 cannons, at least 300 cars) first contacted the front stronghold of Nakai's troops, and then attacked the main force of the workshop in an attempt to break through yenangyaung. However, the rugged terrain and ravines around yenangyaung are extremely unfavorable to armored forces. Although the British and Burmese troops attacked fiercely, they failed to get through the road until dusk. On the way back, the British-Burmese Army 1 Division was already demoralized. In addition, the Japanese army cut off the retreat and water source. Although it has superior forces, it can't get through the retreat alone and ask the Chinese expeditionary force to continue its attack.
After receiving the news that the main force of the British-Burmese Army 1 Division was intercepted, the 33rd Division accelerated its March, and the Infantry 2 14 United Front (the main force of the German army) 1 Brigade first joined forces with the Nakai Army on the evening of18th. Other troops are also expected to meet in yenangyaung on the 20th, joining the British and Burmese armies.
/Kloc-On the evening of 0/8, after a hard day's fighting, the workshop commander arranged his troops and assembled all the troops (including the former Beijing Brigade and Gao Yan Brigade, as well as the German detachment that came to reinforce) in the northeast corner of yenangyaung. At this time, the total strength of Japanese troops in yenangyaung was only 2 14, Jiashan artillery 3rd battalion, and a few auxiliary forces such as 1 engineering team and health team.
/kloc-at dawn on 0/9, the trapped British and Burmese troops once again concentrated all their firepower and stormed the northeast corner. At the same time, the northern national army also strengthened its forces to launch an attack. The Japanese army reinforced Beidukou with 1 squadron, and another German team rushed to the side to fight back.
At the request of the British army, the new 38th Division 1 13 regiment finally decided to take the right-wing 1 and 3 battalions as the main attack and the left-wing 2 battalion as the cover for feint. 18 night, 1 13 regiment 1 and 3 battalion waded under the cover of 2 battalion and set out on the south bank in the early morning. Attack at dawn. 1 Battalion and Battalion 2, with the full cooperation of the British armored forces and artillery, attacked the north and south with the British Burmese army and entered the core oil field in yenangyaung. British armored forces also entered the fork in the road and occupied the top of the oil field at 10. The 3rd Battalion and Japanese reinforcements repeatedly fought for 50 1 highland, and lost three times to three. 14,501The highland was completely conquered, and Zhang Qi, the battalion commander of the 3rd Battalion, died in the battle. 15, Japanese troops retreated south from yenangyaung. The two armies confronted each other in the south of yenangyaung, and the battle against yenangyaung ended with two notes: 16 and 17.
According to Luo and Lin Wei, the commanders of the First Route Army of the Expeditionary Force, respectively sent telegrams to Chiang Kai-shek on the 20th, there were more than 500 Japanese casualties, more than 500 national casualties 100, and the British casualties were unknown 18. According to Sun Liren's memoirs, there were 1 103 fighters in this operation, of which 1 12 1, 204 were killed and 3 18 were injured. According to Qiu Zhongyue, there were more than a thousand Japanese casualties and 522 national casualties. As for the note 2 1200 in Sun Kegang's biography of Myanmar and Wang Chuying's memoirs, "There are more than 65,438 bodies left by the Japanese army", it is extremely unreliable.
After the war, the 1 13 regiment was deployed in the south of yenangyaung, and the team directly under the division and the 1 12 regiment arrived at the north bank of Pinchong River at dusk on 19. On the Japanese side, Araki troops and Harada troops arrived in yenangyaung on the afternoon of 19 and the early morning of 20th. On the morning of 20th, 1 13 regiment got in touch with Japanese reinforcements in the south of yenangyaung. Sun Liren ordered an attack on 2 1 on 20th, but Slim, the leader of the British-Burmese army, sent a secret letter informing him that the 5th army had been stationed. Sun Liren was forced to order the echelon to cover the retreat. On February1day, the 33rd Japanese Division occupied yenangyaung. Note 1: Written by the War History Office of the Defense Research Institute of Japan's Defense Agency, translated by the Compilation Committee of Tianjin CPPCC: Burma War (I), Zhonghua Book Company 1 February, 9871Edition, 9 1-92 pages.
Note 2: Zhang Jiade: The History of China's Anti-Japanese Expedition, Volume I, Defending the Yunnan-Myanmar Highway, Yunnan People's Publishing House, 1994, 1 Edition, pages 302-304.
Note 3: Same as Note 2,305.
Note 4: Shu Hongjian: Interpretation of yenangyaung's Great Victory in the History of Sino-Burmese-Indian War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, Military History,No.1/,p. 8.
Note 5: Same as note 1 on page 94.
Note 6: Qin Xiaoyi, editor-in-chief: Preliminary Compilation of Important Historical Materials of the Republic of China-Anti-Japanese War Period, Volume III, Central Historical Committee of China Kuomintang, 198 1 September, 1 Edition, 296 pages.
Note 7: Same as Note 4,265,438+09-220 (8-2045,8-2046). This is 15 day.
Note 8: The Second Archives of China History: War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression Frontal Battlefield, Jiangsu Ancient Books Publishing House, 1987, 1, 14 18.
Note 9: Same as note 1, pp. 94-95.
Note 10: same as note 2308.
Note 1 1: same as note 1 on page 95.
Note 12: same as note 4,220 (8-2046).
Note 13: same as note 1 on page 95.
Note 14: same as note 4,220 (8-2046).
Note 15: Same as note 1, pp. 95-96.
Note 16: Same as Note 4,220-221(8-2046,8-2047).
Note 17: Same as Note 2,310-311.
Note 18: same as note 6 on pages 296-297.
Note: 19: edited by Huang: Frontal Battlefield in War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression, China (Volume II), Jiangsu People's Publishing House, 1 edition, 1 30 pages,1.
Note 20: Same as Note 2,311.
Note 2 1: Sun Kegang waiting: China Expeditionary Force in North Myanmar, Yunnan People's Publishing House, 1, 12.
Note 22: Wang Chuying: Biography of Yanqiang Victory, Military History, No.8, 2006, 42-5 1.
Note 23: Same as Note 4, page 22 1 (8-2047).
Note 24: Same as note 1 on page 96.
Note 25: Same as Note 4(8-2047) on page 22 1. "Burma War" was produced on 20th.
Note 26: Same as Note 23 14.
Note 27: The same notes 19,1132-1133.