So far, there are three main versions that continue to circulate about Zhang Lingfu’s death: the mainstream “killing theory” in mainland China; the mainstream “suicide theory” in mainland China; and the unusual theory in mainland China. The mainstream "prisoner-killing theory".
1. The theory of killing
Zhang Lingfu was shot to death in the cave of his command post. On May 30, 1947, Chen (Yi) Su (Yu) Tan (Zhenlin) of the East China Field Army (Chen Shi) Chu jointly sent a telegram to the Central Military Commission of the People’s Republic of China. The original text of the telegram is as follows:
Military Commission, Liu and Deng:
(1) According to the final inspection, the commander of the 74th Division Zhang Lingfu, the deputy commander Cai Renjie, and the commander of the 58th Brigade Lu Xing Indeed, when the battle was resolved at 2 pm on the 16th, He Fengshan, deputy commander of our Sixth Column Special Regiment, led his troops and killed him on the spot. When Deputy Commander He of the special regiment approached the cave where Zhang Lingfu and others were hiding, he was introduced by the division adjutant as Zhang Lingfu and others, which is still verified by the prisoner officer.
(2) The commander of the 51st Brigade Chen Chuanjun, the deputy commander Pi Xuanyou, the commander of the 57th Brigade Chen Shuyun, the Chief of Staff Wei Zhenyue, the Deputy Chief of Staff Li Yunliang, the 58th Brigade were also found. He Xiangzhang, deputy commander of the brigade, and Zhao Jiangong, deputy director of the division's information office, were both captured and are now living as prisoners of war in the field.
The Thirty Days of Chen Su and Tan Ju
2. Suicide theory
Zhang Lingfu and other senior military officers collectively "calmly committed suicide" in the cave. This was the Kuomintang's response to the battle The initial version of the show was publicized after it was over. After Zhang Lingfu and his 74th Division were annihilated, Chiang Kai-shek received Zhang Lingfu's suicide note, which wrote: "Today's war situation has worsened. Drinking water has been cut off, food and ammunition have been exhausted. The entire division is alone and surrounded by enemies. I and I The generals fought to the end, and in order to report to the party, the country, and the leaders, the soldiers and subordinates were determined to repay the principal's many years of teachings with one shot."
On May 29, 1947, Chiang Kai-shek issued "For." The article "Announcement to the Kuomintang Officers and Soldiers in Commemoration of Master Zhang Lingfu's Suppression of Bandits and Chengren" was notified to all officers and soldiers of the Kuomintang in recognition of Zhang Lingfu's "death and sacrifice". The article said:
"It is true that people who are unyielding even to death and sacrifice their lives for righteousness, such as all the officers and soldiers of the 74th Division reorganized by our Army, who died heroically in the recent battle of Lunan, are actually the most heroic soldiers since the National Army intercepted the traitors." The most tragic epic and a great honor for our revolutionary soldiers.
Zha's division took advantage of the victory to penetrate deep into the enemy's nest. When it entered the area near Tanbu, it encountered more than four columns of enemy troops and fought a bloody battle. For four days and nights, they fought one after another, covering their wounds and bathing in blood. The more they fought, the stronger they became. Seeing that they were outnumbered and outnumbered, they were ordered to retreat to the high ground in Menglianggu. The stone cliffs there were stacked and the targets were exposed, forming a nest of bombs. Within a few days, people died one after another. The army was cut off, all food and ammunition were exhausted, and the entire division was left alone, surrounded by enemies.
However, the officers and soldiers of the division still believed in completely obeying the orders as their duty, and continued to work hard to defend their positions, vowing to do so even though they knew they could not accomplish their mission. The survival of the Communist Party of China. Among those who died in battle at that time were deputy brigade commander Ming Can and more than 10,000 officers and soldiers. In the end, those who refused to surrender and committed suicide include division commander Zhang Lingfu, deputy division commander Cai Renjie, brigade commander Lu Xing, regiment commander Zhou Shaobin, senior general Fan More than twenty people.
Wow! It is unprecedented in history that they can avenge our loyal and brave soldiers and inherit their great legacy! The spirit of the Communist Party of China is enough to carry forward the noble martial virtues of our revolutionary soldiers, and they are worthy of being the true believers of the Three People's Principles of our Prime Minister."
3. The theory of killing prisoners
After Zhang Lingfu was captured. He was shot and killed by a soldier who violated discipline. The so-called prisoner-killing theory refers to the fact that Zhang Lingfu was first captured by the People's Liberation Army, and later shot to death out of anger by a certain People's Liberation Army soldier responsible for escorting him.
Although the most representative of this statement is an article signed by Leng Yujian titled "Meng Lianggu" published in the seventh issue of 2007 by the "Centennial Tide" magazine sponsored by the Party History Society of China. In the textual research article "The Mystery of Zhang Lingfu's Death During the Battle", the author stated that he "interviewed Comrade Cui Weizhi, who is currently the director of the Party History Research Office of the Linyi Municipal Committee of the Communist Party of China and who was originally involved in the investigation of Zhang Lingfu's death and the examination of his remains, and reviewed the relevant information. "The author's historical data are all based on the memories of the Chinese army cadres who participated in the Menglianggu Battle.
The most significant is the memoir article "Flying Soldiers Fierce Battle at Menglianggu" written by Wang Bicheng, then the commander of the Sixth Column of the East China Field Army, and died unsuccessfully in the rescue effort, which is based on the so-called "field investigation". That is, a return visit to the battlefield more than half a century later.
Extended information
After the war, the commander of the 1st Column, Ye Fei, once mentioned that if the 1st Column could capture Meng Lianggu first, he would work with other columns to attack the 74th Division that was retreating on the road. , it may be possible to annihilate the 74th Division in less than five hours. It can be seen that at this time, it is still a good idea for the 74th Division to seize Meng Lianggu.
When Zhang Lingfu decided to occupy Meng Lianggu, he was more concerned about being able to rely on the commanding heights to stabilize his position as soon as possible, and then counterattack, just like he did when he encountered the People's Liberation Army attack on the Linmeng Highway half a month ago. , and has no intention of sticking to Meng Lianggu.
Because the Menglianggu area is full of stone mountains, it is impossible to build fortifications, and there is no water source. It is not suitable for use as a tactical support point. It is what the military calls a "jedi", and the ammunition carried by the 74th Division itself Most of it has been consumed. The best strategy is to return to Duozhuang as soon as possible instead of fighting the People's Liberation Army in Menglianggu.
But Zhang Lingfu had no choice but to think about it after he fell in love with Meng Lianggu. Because after receiving his telegram of occupying Menglianggu, the Kuomintang army commanding authority believed that the 74th Division occupied the commanding heights and enjoyed geographical advantages. Coupled with its strong combat effectiveness and strong peripheral troops nearby, it was the right place to fight the main force of the East China People's Liberation Army. It was a great opportunity, so Chiang Kai-shek personally ordered the 74th Division to hold on firmly, attract the main force of the People's Liberation Army, and come to a center to bloom!
So the Xuzhou Headquarters and the 1st Corps successively ordered the 74th Division to stick to the rescue center according to the plan of the headquarters. Zhang Lingfu was originally preparing to break out, and it was precisely after the superiors sent the orders one after another. Under pressure, they finally gave up their plan to break out. At this time, the PLA's encirclement situation has not yet taken shape. If the 74th Division really wants to break through with all its strength, the possibility of success is still very high.
However, Zhang Lingfu's consideration of breaking out was firstly a violation of orders, and secondly, he would inevitably lose a large amount of heavy equipment. Even if the breakthrough was successful, he would inevitably be punished. And if they follow the order and wait for reinforcements, at least for now, the 74th Division is fully organized and controls the commanding heights. The distance between friends and neighbors is only a few kilometers away. With the strong combat power of the 74th Division, it is natural to hold on for a day or two.
As Zhang Lingfu said to his subordinates, "With this favorable terrain, as long as the friendly forces come quickly, it is possible to fight successfully!" Of course, to fight well, it is not only whether the 74th Division can hold it, but also It also depends on whether the friendly neighbors can come quickly. No matter what, Zhang Lingfu finally decided to follow the order and stick to Meng Lianggu, which led to the final destruction of the 74th Division.
Faced with the People's Liberation Army that was several times larger than itself, the 74th Division held on for three full days in the waterless land of Menglianggu without losing its true qualities as an ace army. However, reinforcements from friendly neighbors were slow to arrive. In the end, The attempt to make the center bloom failed, and the 74th Division was put on the verge of being completely wiped out.
So the key to the Meng Lianggu Battle is not the 74th Division itself. Zhang Lingfu himself had already had a premonition of this. He wrote in a letter to Chiang Kai-shek on May 6: "Based on the performance of the national army, On the battlefield, the brave are left to their own devices, the timid are left to their own devices, and those who are sacrificed are just sacrifices. Those who are clever think that they will succeed. Rewards are hard to come by, and punishments are often inadequate. They wait and see each other, and cooperation is rare. "Same bedfellows and different dreams."
These points hit the nail on the head. Regardless of whether Zhang Lingfu led his subordinate Meng Lianggu out of his own intention or because of pressure from his superiors, the key point is that the various units of the Kuomintang army are in the same bed but have different dreams, and each has its own plans. Without the slightest idea of ??the overall situation, if the 25th Division and the 83rd Division had rushed to support from the beginning, and the second-echelon 11th Division, the 65th Division, the 48th Division and the 7th Army could all go all out, then the battle situation would not be like this at all.
So the annihilation of the 74th Division in Menglianggu was no accident. If these problems within the Kuomintang army were not resolved, such an ending would occur elsewhere even if it was not in Menglianggu. Therefore, the failure to reach Meng Lianggu was not the key point. The internal contradictions in the Kuomintang army were the crux. This problem not only ruined the 74th Division in Meng Lianggu, but also ultimately lost the entire war.