Plato's most important dialogue, "The State", generally consists of three parts. The first part (towards the end of Book V) consists of the organization of a utopia; the earliest utopia in history. One of the conclusions he reached was that rulers must be philosophers. Volumes 6 and 7 of "The State" both define "philosopher". This discussion forms part two. The third part includes a discussion of the various actually existing systems and their advantages and disadvantages. "National Chapter" is nominally intended to define "justice." But he soon decided that since it was easier to look at things in the big picture than in the small, it was better to start by exploring what a just nation was, rather than what a just individual was. And since justice must be one of the attributes of the best imaginable state, he first describes such a state, and then decides what perfections it has that can be called "just." Let us first describe the broad outlines of Plato's Utopia, and then consider the various problems encountered. From the beginning, Plato determined that citizens should be divided into three classes: ordinary people, soldiers, and defenders of the country. Only the last kind of citizen can have political power. Their numbers are much smaller than the other two classes. At first they seem to have been chosen by the legislator, and thereafter they were usually hereditary; but in exceptional cases promising children were raised from the lower classes, and in the case of the children of the Patriots When there are children or young people who are unsatisfactory, they can also be demoted. In Plato's view, the main problem is how to ensure that the defenders can realize the intentions of the legislators. He made various suggestions for this purpose, some educational, some economic, some biological, some religious. But the extent to which these suggestions apply to classes other than defenders is often not clear; some of them are obviously applicable to soldiers; but in general Plato treats only defenders. Those who protect the country are a class of their own, just like the Jesuits of Paraguay in the past, the priests of the Holy See before 1870, and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union today. The first thing to consider is education. Education is divided into two parts, namely music and physical education. Each of them had a much broader meaning than today: "music" meant everything that fell within the domain of the goddess of literature and art, and "sports" meant everything related to the training and adaptation of the body. "Music" is about as broad as what we call "culture," and "sports" is even broader than what we call "sport." To engage in culture is to make one a gentleman, in the very sense with which England is familiar (in large part because of Plato). The Athens of Plato's time was in one respect very similar to nineteenth-century England: both had an aristocratic class that enjoyed wealth and social prestige but did not monopolize political power. Behave to gain as much power as possible. However, in Plato's Utopia, the rule of the aristocracy is unrestricted. Dignity, etiquette and bravery seem to be the main qualities that education seeks to cultivate. From the earliest years there was a strict censorship of the literature to which young people were exposed and the music they were allowed to hear. Mothers and nannies can only tell official stories to their children. Both Homer and Hesiod were not allowed to tell for some reason. First of all, what Homer and Hesiod said about gods sometimes behaving badly does not serve an educational purpose; young people must be taught that evil never comes from gods, because "gods" are not everything. the creator of only beautiful things. Secondly, there are things in the works of Homer and Hesiod that are thought to make readers fear death, but everything in education should make young people willing to die on the battlefield. Our children must be taught that slavery is worse than death, and they should never hear stories of good men crying, even over the death of a friend. Third, etiquette requires that people never laugh out loud, but Homer mentioned that "the happy gods laugh endlessly." If children can quote this passage, how can teachers effectively reprimand children for their playfulness? Fourth, some passages in Homer's poems praise grand banquets, while others describe the desires of the gods; these are all harmful to moderation. (Priest Yinze was a true Platonist. He objected to this sentence in a famous hymn: "The cheers of those who triumph, the songs of those who feast", which is a description of heaven. of joyful scenes). Finally, there must never be a story in which the bad guys are happy and the good guys are unhappy; this may have the most unfortunate moral implications for a weak mind. For all these reasons the poet deserves to be denounced. Plato then advanced a strange argument about drama. He said that good people should not be willing to imitate bad people; but most plays have bad guys, so dramatists and actors who play bad guys must imitate bad guys who are guilty of various crimes. Not only criminals, but women, slaves, and lower classes in general should not be imitated by superiors. (In Greece, as in Elizabethan England, female roles were played by men.) Therefore, if acting was allowed at all, it could only include flawless, well-born male characters.
This impossibility was so obvious that Plato decided to expel all dramatists from his city: when a showman so clever as to imitate anything comes to us and offers to perform him When we read about his art and his poetry, we will worship him with all our hearts as a lovely, divine, and wonderful person; but we must also tell him that he is not allowed in our country. Such people; the law cannot tolerate them. So we anointed him with spices, put a velvet wreath on his head, and sent him to another city. Secondly, let’s look at their censorship system for music (music in the modern sense). Lydian and Ionian music were forbidden, the former because it expressed sorrow, the latter because it was a melancholy sound. Only the music of Doria (because it is brave) and Phrygia (because it is temperate) is allowed. The allowed rhythm must be simple and expressive of a courageous and harmonious life. The training for the body is very strict. In addition to grilled fish and barbecue, no one is allowed to eat fish or meat cooked by other methods, and neither any seasonings nor any snacks are allowed. He said that people who followed his food regimen would never need a doctor. Young people are not allowed to see ugliness and sin until they reach a certain age. But when the time comes, they must be allowed to see all kinds of "temptations"; let them see horrible images so that they will not be frightened, and let them see bad pleasures so that they will not tempt their will. Only after they have withstood these tests can they be considered suitable as defenders of the country. Boys should see war before they grow up, although they do not have to fight it themselves. As for the economic aspect: Plato proposed that the defenders should practice a kind of complete communism, and (I think) the soldiers should also practice it, although this is not clear. The defenders were to have small houses and simple food; they were to live as in a military camp, eating together; they were to have no private property except what was absolutely necessary. Gold and silver were prohibited. Although they are not rich, there is no reason why they should be unhappy; the purpose of the city-state is for the benefit of the entire people, not for the happiness of one class. Wealth and poverty are both harmful, and neither existed in Plato's city. He had a very strange argument about war, saying that since the city-state never wanted to share any of the spoils, it must be able to easily bribe its allies. Plato's Socrates, with a pretentious reluctance, applies his communism to the family. He said that everything among friends should be shared by everyone, including wives and children. He acknowledged the difficulties but did not view them as insurmountable. First of all, the girls received the same education strictly as the boys, learning music and sports, and learning the techniques of war with the boys. Women are completely equal to men in all aspects. "The education that makes a man a good defender of the country will also make a woman a good defender of the country; because their natures are the same." No doubt there are differences between men and women; but that has nothing to do with politics. Some women have philosophical minds and are suitable as defenders of the country; some women are warlike and can become good soldiers. After the legislators selected some men and women as defenders, they ordered them to live in the same house and eat the same food. Marriage as we understand it must be completely transformed. ① On certain festivals, the bridegrooms and brides (whose number should be sufficient to keep the population constant) are united together, making them believe that they are united by lot; but in fact the ruler of the city-state is distributed according to eugenic principles. They arranged it so that the best father would have the most children. All children are taken away from their parents as soon as they are born, and care is taken so that the parents never know who their children are, and the children never know who their parents are. Deformed children and children of bad parents "are put into a mysterious place unknown to anyone, as they should be." Any child born from a union not sanctioned by the state is considered illegitimate. The mother's age should be between twenty and forty years old, and the father's age should be between twenty-five and fifty-five years old. Outside these age limits, sexual intercourse is free; but they are forced to abort or kill infants. In a "marriage" arranged by the state, the individuals involved have no say; they are driven by the idea of ??their duty to the state, not by anything that the exiled poets so often sang about. Driven by that mediocre feeling. Since everyone does not know who his parents are, he calls everyone who is old enough to be a father "father", and the same goes for "mother", "brother" and "sister". (This situation also occurred among some savages, and often caused missionaries to feel puzzled). There is no "marriage" between "father" and "daughter", or between "mother" and "son"; generally speaking (but not absolutely), marriage between "brothers" and "sisters" is also prohibited. (I think if Plato had thought this through carefully, he would have discovered that he had forbidden all marriages except the marriage of "brother and sister", which he regarded as an extreme exception.
) It can be imagined that the sentiments now associated with the words "father", "mother", "son" and "daughter" are still associated with these words under Plato's new arrangement; for example, a young man cannot Hit an old man because he's probably hitting his father. The advantage Plato sought was, of course, to reduce private sentiments, thereby removing the obstacles to the dominance of the public spirit and to the abolition of private property. The reason why monks want to be celibate is generally based on similar motives. I will finally turn to the theological aspects of this system. I don't want to talk about the Greek gods it accepted, I just want to talk about some of the myths that the government inculcated. Plato clearly said that lying is the prerogative of the government, just as prescribing medicine is the prerogative of the doctor. We have already discussed that the government is deceiving the people by pretending to arrange marriages by drawing lots. But this is not yet a religious matter. There is "a noble lie," which Plato hopes may deceive the ruler, and in any case will deceive the people of the entire city-state. This "lie" was concocted in quite detail. The most important part of it is the dogma that God created three kinds of men: the best kind is made of gold, the second best kind is made of silver, and the common people are made of bronze and iron. Those made of gold are suitable for defending the country; those made of silver should be soldiers, while the rest are engaged in manual labor. Children usually (but not always) belong to the class of their parents; if they do not belong to that class, they must be promoted or demoted accordingly. He believed that it was impossible to convince the current generation of such myths, but that the next generation, and all subsequent generations, could be educated so that they would not doubt such myths. Plato was quite right in thinking that belief in such a myth could be cultivated within two generations. The Japanese were taught that the emperor was born of the Japanese god and that Japan was founded earlier than any other country in the world. Any university professor who doubted these dogmas in even one academic work would be dismissed for anti-Japanese activities. But what Plato seems to have failed to realize is that forcing others to accept this myth is incompatible with philosophy, and it contains a kind of education that can damage human reason. The definition of "justice," which is the nominal goal of the entire discussion, is achieved in Book IV. Justice, he tells us, consists in everyone doing his own work and not being a meddler: when merchants, auxiliaries, and patriots each do his own work without interfering with the work of other classes, the whole The city-state is righteous. It is certainly a laudable injunction that every man should mind his own business, but it hardly corresponds to what modern men naturally call "justice." The Greek word we have translated corresponds to a very important idea in Greek thought, but we lack an exact equivalent. It is worth recalling what Anaximander said: The thing from which all things come into being, to which all things return after their destruction, is determined by fate. For all things make reparation for their mutual injustices in due time. Before the beginning of philosophy, the Greeks had already had a theory, or feeling, about the universe. This theory or feeling can be called religious or ethical. According to this theory, everyone or everything has his or her prescribed status and prescribed duties. But this does not depend on the decree of Zeus, for Zeus himself is subject to this decree that governs all things. This theory is tied to the idea of ??fate or necessity. It is especially emphatically applied to celestial bodies. But wherever there is life, there is a tendency to push the boundaries of justice; hence the struggle. There is an otherworldly, super-Olympic law that punishes Fang. Four times, and constantly restoring the eternal order that the invaders want to destroy. The whole point of view passed (at first perhaps almost imperceptibly) into philosophy; this is also shown in the cosmology of struggle, for example in that of Heraclitus and Empedocles, and as manifested in monistic doctrines, as in that of Parmenides. This is the root of the Greeks' belief in the laws of nature and the world. This is obviously the basis of Plato's concept of justice. The sense in which the term "justice" is still used in law is more similar to Plato's idea than the other senses in which it is used in political thought. Influenced by democratic theory, we have become accustomed to combining justice and equality; however, Plato does not have this meaning. "Justice" - in the sense that it is almost a synonym for "law" (for example, we say "courts") - refers primarily to property rights, which has nothing to do with equality. The definition of "justice" mentioned for the first time at the beginning of "The State" is: justice consists in paying off debts. This definition was immediately abandoned as inappropriate, but elements of it persisted to the end of the conversation. There are several points worth noting in Plato's definition. First, it makes possible inequalities, but not injustices, of power and privilege. Patriots must have all the power because they are the wisest members of the whole society; in Plato's definition, disobedience will only occur when someone in other classes is wiser than some of the patriots. justice.
This is why Plato proposed the promotion and degradation of citizens, although he believed that the double convenience of birth and education can in most cases make the descendants of the defenders superior to the descendants of others. If there could be a more accurate politics and its precepts more accurately followed, there would be much to admire about Plato's system. No one would think that it is unfair to put the best football players on the football team, even though they can gain a great advantageous position as a result. If the football team is managed as democratically as the government in Athens, then the students who represent the school in playing football will also be elected by drawing lots. However, when it comes to political matters, it is difficult to know who is the most skilled; and it is also difficult to say with certainty that a politician will be able to use his skills for the benefit of the public rather than for his own personal benefit. interests, or his class or party or sectarian interests. Secondly, Plato's definition of "justice" presupposes that there must be a "state", whether it is organized along traditional lines or organized according to Plato's own way, so that its entirety can achieve a certain ethical goal. ideal. He tells us that justice consists in everyone doing his own work. But what is one's job? In a country that has remained unchanged from generation to generation, like ancient Egypt or the kingdoms of the Incas, a man's job is his father's job, and nothing goes wrong. But in Plato's country no one has a legal father. His work is therefore determined either by his own interests or by the state's judgment of his talents. The latter is clearly what Plato desires. However, some work, although highly technical, can be considered harmful; Plato thought poetry was harmful, and I think Napoleon's work was harmful. Therefore, the government's intentions become paramount in determining what a person's job will be. Although all rulers must be philosophers, there will be no innovation: a philosopher must always be one who understands and agrees with Plato. If we ask: What can Plato's "state" accomplish? The answer is rather boring. It can win successfully against countries with roughly equal populations, and it can ensure the survival of certain minorities. Because of its rigidity it almost never produced art or science; in this as in many other respects it was Spartan. Despite all the nice talk, all it achieved was combat skills and enough food. Plato had experienced the famine and defeat of Athens; perhaps he subconsciously believed that avoiding these disasters was the highest achievement a statesman could achieve. If taken seriously, a utopia must obviously embody the ideals of its creator. Let us first consider what we mean by "ideal." First, it is desired by the person who believes in it, but its being desired is not exactly the same as one's desire for personal enjoyment (e.g., food and shelter). The difference between what constitutes an "ideal" and the object of an everyday wish is that the former is impersonal; it is something that has nothing special (at least on the surface) about the personal self of the person who feels the wish. It is something that is related, so in theory it may be desired by everyone. We can therefore define an "ideal" as something that is desired without being self-centered, so that the person who desires it also hopes that everyone else can desire it. I can wish that everyone has enough to eat, that everyone can be kind to everyone else, and so on; and if I wish any of these things, I also wish that others wish it too. In this way I can establish an ethics that appears to be impersonal, although in fact it is based on my own personally based wishes; - for the wishes are always mine, even if they are What I wish for has nothing to do with me personally. For example, one person may wish that everyone can understand science; another wish that everyone can appreciate art; but what makes the difference between these two people's wishes is their personal differences. Whenever an argument is involved, the personal element is immediately apparent. For example, someone said: "You are wrong to want everyone to be happy. You should want the Germans to be happy and everyone else to be unhappy." The "should" here can be thought of as referring to what the speaker hopes I can desire. I could retort that I am not a German and it is psychologically impossible for me to wish all non-Germans misfortune; but this answer does not seem to be appropriate. In addition, there may be a conflict of purely impersonal ideals. Nietzsche's heroes are different from Christian saints, but both are worshiped impersonally, the former by Nietzsche's followers and the latter by Christians. How can we choose between the two except by our own desires? Yet, if nothing else, an ethical difference of opinion has to be decided by emotional preference or by force, and ultimately by war. For questions of fact, we can appeal to science and the scientific method; but for fundamental questions of ethics there seems to be no such thing. However, if this is indeed the case, then the ethical debate itself reduces to a struggle of power, including propaganda power.
This view is already sketchily formulated by Thrasymachus in the first book of the Republic; Thrasymachus, like nearly all the characters in Plato's dialogues, is a real figure. He was a wise man from Chalcedon and a famous teacher of rhetoric; he appeared in Aristophanes' comedies in 427 BC. After Socrates discussed justice for a while with an old man named Cephalus and with Plato's brothers Glaucon and Adeimentus, Thrasymachus became increasingly displeased. Impatient, I broke in with a passionate protest against this childish nonsense. He emphasized that "justice is nothing but the interests of the strong." Socrates countered this view with sophistry; it was never well addressed. But it raises a fundamental question in ethics and politics, that is, are there any standards for "good" and "bad" other than what people desire when they use the words "good" and "bad"? Woolen cloth? If not, many of the conclusions drawn by Thrasimachus would seem inevitable. However, how can we say that there is such a standard? At this point, it might seem at first glance that religion has a simple answer. God determines what is good and what is bad; a person is a good person if his will is in harmony with God's will. However, this answer is not very orthodox. Theologians say that God is good, but this implies that there is a standard of good and bad that exists independent of God's will. So we have to face the following question: that is, in a statement like "happiness is good", is there any objective truth in the same sense as in a statement like "snow is white"? Or fake? To answer this question, a long discussion is necessary. One could imagine that in practice we could get away from this fundamental argument and say, "I don't know what 'objective truth' means. But if all (or indeed all) people who have examined this question If everyone unanimously supports a certain statement, then I will consider this statement to be "true." In this sense, snow is white, Caesar was stabbed to death, and water is made of hydrogen and oxygen. , etc., are all "true". We are thus faced with a factual question: Are there any similar statements of opinion in ethics? If so, they could serve as the basis for a personal code of conduct as well as for a political theory. But if not, then no matter what the philosophical truth may be, as long as there are irreconcilable ethical divisions between powerful groups, in practice we have to resort to a contest of force or a contest of propaganda. Or the two are competing at the same time. For Plato, this problem did not actually exist. Although his sense of drama led him to give a powerful account of Thrasimachus's position, he was completely unaware of its force, and he himself refuted it with unusual brutality and unfairness. Plato is convinced that "good" exists and its nature can be determined; when people have different opinions, at least one of them has made an intellectual error, just as these differences of opinion are related to the science of certain facts. Same problem. The disagreement between Plato and Thrasymachus is of great importance; but for the historian of philosophy it is one that requires attention rather than resolution. Plato thought he could prove that his country was good; and a democrat who recognized the objectivity of ethics could think he could. The country is bad; but anyone who agrees with Thrasymachus will say: "There is no question of proof or disproof here; the only question is whether you like what Plato desires. Country. If you like it, it is good for you; if you don't like it, it is bad for you. If many people like it and many people don't like it, then it cannot be done by reason, but by reality. Or covert violence?" This is a philosophical question that has been debated to this day; each side has many respectable figures. But for a long period of time, the views promoted by Plato remained almost unobjectionable. In addition, we should also note that the view that substitutes consensus for objective standards contains consequences that few people are willing to accept. What should we say about a scientific innovator like Galileo who preached an idea that few agreed with at the time but eventually gained near-universal support? These people use reasoning instead of inciting emotions, state propaganda or forceful methods. This implies that there is another standard besides general opinions. In matters of ethics, the great religious teachers were in somewhat similar situations. Jesus Christ taught that it is not wrong to pick up ears of grain and eat them on the Sabbath, but it is wrong to hate your enemies. Such ethical opinions obviously imply some standard that is different from the opinions of most people, but no matter what this standard is, it is by no means like the objective facts in scientific issues. This problem is a difficult one, and I don't claim to be able to solve it. For now let us content ourselves with merely noting this problem. Plato's state, unlike many modern utopias, may have been intended to be implemented. This is not as fantastical and impossible as we would naturally think.
Many of its provisions, including some that we would consider completely impossible to implement, were actually implemented in Sparta. Pythagoras had experimented with the rule of philosophers; in Plato's time, when Plato visited Sicily and southern Italy, the Pythagorean Architas was at Taras (modern Tarando). ) is very powerful politically. It was a common practice in city-states at that time to ask a wise man to draw up laws; Solon did this for Athens, and Pythagoras did it for Turi. At that time, the colonies were completely independent of their mother states; it was entirely possible for a group of Platonists to establish an utopia on the coast of Spain or Gaul. Unfortunately chance brought Plato to Syracuse, and this great commercial city was engaged in a desperate war with Carthage; in such an atmosphere no philosopher could achieve much. In the next era, the rise of Macedonia rendered all small states obsolete and all rudimentary political experiments futile.