Zhao Yiman’s story
In November 1935, the troops led by Zhao Yiman were surrounded by Japanese and puppet troops. She asked the regiment leader to lead the team to break out of the encirclement, and she acted as cover, with her left hand Wounded by a bullet in the wrist. She was discovered by the enemy while she was recuperating in hiding in the village. When she rose to fight, her left thigh bone was pierced by a bullet. She was arrested due to excessive bleeding and fell into a coma. She was taken to the Puppet Binjiang Provincial Police Department in Harbin and tortured. She fell into coma several times, but remained steadfast and unyielding. When she was dying, the Japanese invaders were worried that they would not get a confession after she died, so they sent her to Harbin Municipal First Hospital for surveillance and treatment. Dong Xianxun, the Puppet Manchukuo policeman who was responsible for guarding her, and Han Yongyi, the female hospital nurse, were both moved by her bravery. They also listened to her propaganda of resisting Japan and saving the nation, so they decided to join the Anti-Japanese Alliance team. With the help of the two men, she escaped from Harbin late at night on June 28, 1936, heading towards the anti-Japanese guerrilla zone.
The pseudo-mountain police team caught up with their carriage in the early morning of the third day, and Zhao Yiman was arrested again. The enemy tortured her repeatedly for a month, but she just scolded them angrily: "You can turn the entire village into rubble and chop people into mud, but you can't destroy the faith of Communist Party members!"
After Zhao Yiman was injured and arrested and taken to Harbin, the Japanese invaders and the puppet police chiefs immediately interrogated her. At this time, the blood flowing out of her wounds soaked her cotton-padded clothes, and she continued to denounce the atrocities committed by the Japanese invaders in occupying Northeast China. The Japanese spy in charge of the interrogation became so angry that he drove bamboo sticks through her nails and stabbed Zhao Yiman's wounds with a whip, causing her to faint several times. The Japanese invaders took her to the hospital. Her injuries were a little better. The Japanese invaders interrogated her again in front of the hospital bed. Zhao Yiman still refused to tell the truth. The Japanese invaders punched and kicked her. Her wounds broke open again and she passed out again. The medical staff and even the police guarding the hospital admired her.
The Battle of Huangyangjie
In August 1928, the enemy forces from Hunan and Jiangxi took advantage of the main force of the Fourth Red Army to lose in southern Hunan. When they were about to return home, the soldiers invaded and occupied Jinggangshan. In the plain area of ??the revolutionary base area, they finally attacked Huangyangjie with four regiments in an attempt to occupy the Jinggangshan revolutionary base area in one fell swoop.
Hearing the news that the enemy was about to attack, Chen Yi'an, the commander of the first battalion, led the first and third companies of the first battalion to march back to Xiaojing under Huangyangjie, held a meeting, arranged the battle, and conducted Intense battle mobilization. Mildly injured patients in rear hospitals requested to return to the front line. Children's Corps and Young Pioneers were all mobilized under the leadership of the local government. Red Guards, riot squads, and young women were also actively organized to prepare to cooperate with the Red Army in combat. The Red Army and local military teams also built bamboo nail arrays, barbed wire fences, fences, rolling logs and stones, and bunker fortifications to build five lines of defense at the Huangyangjie outpost. The entire Jinggang Mountains were prepared to severely attack the invading enemy.
On August 30, after the clouds and fog cleared, four regiments from the Hunan Army's Wu Shang Department and the Jiangxi enemy Wang Jun's Department began to attack Huangyangjie. The Red Army commanders and local armed forces relied on the natural dangers of Huangyangjie and used stones, rolling logs, bamboo nails and weapons in their hands to repel four enemy charges. At about four o'clock in the afternoon, the enemy was unwilling to fail and organized a larger attack again. At this moment, the Red Army soldiers carried a better mortar that the 28th Regiment left for repair at the Fourth Red Army Ordnance Department in Ciping to Huangyangjie and placed it near the Red Army command position. At that time, there were only three artillery shells. The first two shells became dumb due to moisture. At this time, the third artillery shell was ejected. There was only a loud "bang" and the shell exploded among the enemy groups. At this time, the Young Pioneers and children's groups lurking on various hills lit firecrackers in kerosene barrels and hung red flags on the treetops. Suddenly, guns and cannons fired in Huangyangjie and red flags were waved. The enemy originally received intelligence that the main force of the Red Army was not in Jinggangshan. At this time, seeing this formation, they thought that the main force of the Red Army had returned to Jinggangshan. They were so frightened that they fled back to Lingxian County overnight.
Afterwards, the Red Army soldiers adapted Zhuge Liang's lyrics from the Peking Opera "Empty City Strategy" and compiled a libretto: "I stood on Huangyangjie and watched the mountain scenery, and suddenly I heard people and horses rushing down the mountain. I raised my eyes and looked up to watch. , it turned out that they were soldiers sent by the Chiang Kai-shek. Firstly, the peasants had little experience in the struggle. Secondly, the main force of the Red Army had left Yongxin. Since you were so lucky to have Ninggang and Xincheng, why did you dare to invade Xiaowujing? Since you came. Why are we setting up a camp at the foot of the mountain? Don't think too hard. I have no ambush inside and no reinforcements outside. Come, come, come, please come to the mountain to talk about revolution." "The Empty Mountain Strategy" was sung. On his way back to Jinggangshan with the main force of the Fourth Red Army, Mao Zedong went to Huang'ao and heard the news of the victory in the defense battle of Huangyangjie. He happily wrote the famous poem "Moon over Xijiang·Jinggangshan" to praise Huangyangjie. Victory in the defensive battle.
Commissioner Mao is very resourceful and decisive
After visiting Jinggang Mountains, a commander from a Latin American country praised meaningfully: "Jinggang Mountains is a fascinating place. Mao Zedong went to Tongtong Astronomy, geography. The place he chose is a place where dragons and tigers are hidden - the dragons of the Chinese Communist Party and the tigers of the workers and peasants' revolutionary army are hidden. The establishment of this base is closely linked to the victory of the Chinese revolution. Together. "The dragon cannot stay on the beach, it can only dive into the sea to stir up the waves; the tiger cannot stay in Pingyang, it must rely on the mountains and forests to move the mountains.
In October 1927, Mao Zedong led the workers' and peasants' revolutionary army to Jinggang Mountains, where "hidden dragons and crouching tigers" existed, and experienced more than four months of struggle.
The establishment of the first rural base area of ??the Chinese revolution achieved the first great turning point in the history of our party.
In May 1928, Zhu De and Mao Zedong met in Jinggangshan. The strength of the Red Army was greatly strengthened. They fought several victorious battles in Wudoujiang, Caoshi'ao, and Longyuankou. The border struggle entered its heyday. This is mainly reflected in the expansion of the main force of the Red Army from two regiments to four regiments; the scope of the red area includes Ninggang, Yongxin, and Lianhua counties and parts of Suichuan, Ji'an, Anfu, and Lingxian counties, and has generally established Local armed forces; all counties, districts, and townships have established party and government organizations, and the highest local party and government leading organs—the Central *** Hunan-Kiangxi Border Special Committee and the Workers’, Peasants, and Soldiers Government—were established in the base areas; a comprehensive campaign was launched to crack down on local tyrants and allocate farmland With the mass movement, the farmers' dream of "land to the tiller" has been realized.
The reason why the situation developed so fast during this period is that “the policies of the border parties (local parties and military parties) are correct.” These policies are: “Resolutely fight against the enemy Struggle to create a regime in the middle part of the Luoxiao Mountains and oppose escapeism; deepen the agrarian revolution in separatist areas; the army's party helps the development of local parties, and the army's armed forces help the development of local armed forces; it takes the defensive against Hunan, where the ruling power is relatively strong, and Take the offensive in Jiangxi, where the ruling power is relatively weak; use vigorous efforts to manage Yongxin, create a mass separatist regime, and arrange a long-term struggle; concentrate the Red Army to attack the current enemy, oppose the division of troops, and avoid being defeated by the enemy individually. The expansion of the separatist areas adopts a wave-like promotion policy , Opposing aggressive policies."
Mao Zedong was very resourceful and decisive, and he correctly chose Jinggangshan as a base for deep-rooted revolutionary struggle, not because he had Zhuge Liang's talent for "observing the sky" and "ingenious ideas." He was good at starting from reality and determined it on the basis of in-depth investigation and research on the politics, economy and geography of Jinggangshan.
Mao Zedong believed that Jinggangshan has many advantages: first, it has the foundation for the work of the party and the masses since the Great Revolution; second, it has "green forest friends" such as Yuan Wencai and Wang Zuo; third, it is conducive to combat The geographical situation is that the reactionary rule here is relatively weak, the economic support conditions are relatively good, and every move here has a greater impact on Hunan and Jiangxi provinces. Therefore, Mao Zedong confirmed that Jinggangshan has the right time, location, and people, and is a good place for the development of revolution. Mao Zedong, like many great historical figures, remained steadfast in his ideals and beliefs, even under high pressure and punishment. At that time, it was said that he "made a serious political mistake" by not attacking Changsha after leading the troops in the Autumn Harvest Uprising and pulling the troops up Jinggangshan. Therefore, he was revoked as an alternate member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and secretary of the former committee. This decision When the news reached Jinggangshan, it was changed again. It was said that he had been expelled from the party and could only serve as a division commander and was not allowed to serve as a party representative. Mao Zedong was still fearless. He did not lose heart or waver, and unswervingly established rural base areas.
Mao Zedong was a man who "read a thousand books and traveled thousands of miles". He proposed and implemented the theory of "armed separatism of workers and peasants" in Jinggangshan, which was a political line of flesh and blood. The specific content of this line is: establishing a base, building political power in a planned way, deepening the agrarian revolution, and expanding the people's armed forces. To be precise, he took the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism and the specific conditions of China as the cornerstone and creatively opened up the Chinese-style revolutionary road of "rural areas encircling cities and seizing power with armed force" - the Jinggangshan Road, thus writing Downloaded the sequel to Marxism-Leninism——China Chapter.
In June 1928, just as the border struggle was developing, a man named Du Xiujing came from Hunan. He said that the enemy forces in southern Hunan were "very shaken" and "panic." , on behalf of the Provincial Party Committee, he wanted to forcefully drag the Red Army to southern Hunan to attack Chenzhou. Mao Zedong asked him about the mobilization of workers and peasants in southern Hunan, the organization of local armed forces, the deployment of enemy forces, etc., but he was ignorant of all the questions. If you don't even grasp some of the most basic situations like this, how can you easily get started? !
This vital issue was fully discussed at the joint meeting of the Military Commission, Special Committee, and Yongxin County Committee held in Yongxin County at the end of June. At the meeting, Mao Zedong pointed out: "Moving the team to southern Hunan at this time, far away from the base area, may cause the danger of 'the tiger has fallen flat and been bullied by the dog'." The meeting decided not to implement the instructions of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee and continue to consolidate and expand the base area in Jinggangshan struggle and wrote a report recommending that the provincial party committee reconsider.
However, the representatives of the Provincial Party Committee ignored the decision of the meeting and did not listen to the dissuasion of the Military Commission. They took advantage of Mao Zedong's division of troops in Yongxin to mobilize the masses and pulled the two main regiments stationed in Ling County to southern Hunan to attack Chenzhou. As a result, half of the two regiments were lost, and all the border counties were occupied by enemy troops. Countless people were killed and houses burned, resulting in the "August failure" of the border struggle.
In order to overcome blindness and enhance consciousness, Mao Zedong held a meeting of cadres above the camp level of the Fourth Red Army in Guidong County at the end of August to examine the dangers of subjectivism and summarize the lessons of the "August Failure"; It was pointed out that "unclear enemy situation", "expedition in the summer heat", "departure from the red zone" and "pure military adventure" were important reasons for this failure. At the end of 1929, when summarizing the experience since the Nanchang Uprising and the Jinggangshan struggle, Mao Zedong pointed out: "Subjectivism exists strongly among some party members, which is very detrimental to analyzing the political situation and guiding work.
Because the inevitable result of subjectivist analysis of the political situation and subjectivist guidance of work is either opportunism or putschism. "
Mao Zedong has been tirelessly reading Marxist-Leninist works such as "The Manifesto of the Communist Party" since 1920. After coming to Jinggangshan, he repeatedly studied some classical military classics. At that time, his most precious family property They were two book baskets. Whether he moved to border counties or returned to his "hometown" in the base area, he never forgot to take these "partners" with him. Even though he lived a rough life as a soldier, he still raced against time to read various books. Books and newspapers. He gave the soldiers in the guard platoon a clear task: after capturing a place, they must take the opportunity to collect all kinds of books, newspapers, and documents. In May 1928, the Red Army attacked Gaolongwei in Chaling County. Many books and newspapers were confiscated from the home of Kuomintang warlord Tan Yankai, and among them happened to be a copy of "The Romance of the Three Kingdoms" that Mao Zedong had longed for. After seeing it, Mao Zedong praised it repeatedly: "This is really a clear sky after the clouds are cleared, and it is indescribable." ”
Mao Zedong read ancient and modern classics at home and abroad, but always adhered to one principle, which is to use Marxist-Leninist positions, viewpoints, and methods to solve practical problems in the Chinese revolution and serve real struggles. He shared the same views with those who believed in and People who are so ancient that they can’t get out of their old stories are completely different from those who insist on talking about Greece and have no understanding of China’s national conditions. As he often said, theory is integrated with practice, “aiming at the target” "Fire arrows."
The reason why Mao Zedong had such great courage and courage to resolutely resist the Hunan Provincial Party Committee's decision to have the Red Army rush into southern Hunan was because he had conducted in-depth investigations into the enemy forces in Hunan and Jiangxi provinces. Compare. At that time, the Kuomintang army stationed in Hunan had six armies and six divisions. They were not only large in number, but also powerful in combat. The Red Army had four battles with the Hunan enemy Wu Shang's Eighth Army, but only suffered losses. A small part of the enemy's main force suffered no losses. Although the Jiangxi enemy also had three armies, there were only three divisions participating in the "suppression" of Jinggangshan. Among them, except Liu Shiyi, the commander of the 7th Independent Division, was from Duchang County, Jiangxi. They were all troops transferred from Yunnan by Chiang Kai-shek. After this analysis, Mao Zedong concluded: "Jiangxi does not have troops from its own province, and troops from other provinces have always been stationed here. Foreign troops are not familiar with the situation and are not as close to the situation as the provincial army, so they are often not very enthusiastic when it comes to "suppressing communists" and "suppressing bandits". " Faced with this reality, he formulated and implemented the policy of "taking a defensive position in Hunan, where the ruling power is relatively strong, and taking an offensive position in Jiangxi, where the ruling power is relatively weak." In other words, the enemy in Hunan can only be defended, and it is not appropriate to attack; They can take the initiative to attack the enemy forces in Jiangxi and actively advance; practice has proved that Mao Zedong's analysis is correct. In the first half of 1928, the Jinggangshan Red Army competed with the enemy forces in Jiangxi many times in Suichuan, Ninggang, and Yongxin, winning consecutive battles and accumulating accumulated losses. Annihilated and defeated eight enemy regiments, captured a large number of guns and ammunition, and defeated the enemy forces in Jiangxi into chaos without the ability to fight back.
Mao Zedong planned a decisive victory thousands of miles away, relying on the strength of the enemy and ourselves. research and scientific analysis.
He flexibly used Marxist principles, combined with the specific conditions of Jinggangshan, and led the revolutionary struggle in Jinggangshan to victory one after another with his keen political understanding and excellent military command skills.