In the 12th year of Yongli in the Southern Ming Dynasty, that is, in June of the 15th year of Shunzhi in the Qing Dynasty and the first year of Manji in Japan, Zheng Chenggong sent monks Gui Wu and Ruxi east to Nagasaki, Japan, and submitted Zheng Chenggong's letter to Tokugawa Letters from the shogunate and other 4th shogun Tokugawa Ietsuna. In his letter, Zheng Chenggong first praised the shogunate, and then based on his own experience, he said: "Success is born at the sunrise, and the clouds follow it as long as it is. He is concerned about the safety of the world, and he will be the most loyal and auspicious in a hundred battles." He encouraged himself with Yan Zhenqing's integrity to show his determination to resist the Qing Dynasty. Zheng Chenggong hoped to develop friendly relations with Japan, but the key was the end of the letter, which pointed out: "Zhongxing Yire, I dare to hope that Seng Guiwu can come back as before. It is difficult to express the feelings, and the words are not full of meaning." It is a metaphor for the Northern Expedition of the Southern Ming Dynasty. , the hidden story of Qubi, a beggar, will be told by Gui Wu, as he went to Nagasaki in the past. What was the result? According to Volume 18 of the "Dai Encyclopedia" compiled by Japan's Pandora Society, the shogunate rejected Zheng Chenggong's request to send troops. Chapter 4 of Genjiro Awada's "Modern History of Japan" also states that the shogunate did not allow the troops to be sent. However, in fact, Tokugawa Ietsuna responded to Zheng Chenggong's begging for troops with practical actions this time. This is an issue that has been ignored by the history of China and Japan so far. History is complicated, and we should be grateful to the Korean historical records for leaving relevant records.
According to the Korean manuscript Li "Piaoren Q&A", the confession of Zeng Sheng, a survivor of the Ming Dynasty, is quoted as saying: "At the beginning of the Gengzi summer, Japan mobilized a large number of troops, and those who followed the Japanese guests to Japan went to Beijing." Suddenly there was a strong wind and the boat could not move forward, so we returned to the army. This means that "the beginning of the summer of Gengzi" was in the early summer of the 14th year of Yongli in the Southern Ming Dynasty, that is, the 17th year of Shunzhi in the Qing Dynasty and the third year of Riwanzhi in the Qing Dynasty. , under the leadership of the "***" living in Japan, "to go to Beijing", which means that Japan has openly sided with the Southern Ming Dynasty in the war between the Ming and Qing Dynasties in China, and is in a unilateral state of war with the Qing court. However, on the way, "suddenly encountered a strong wind and the boat could not move forward." It was obvious that many Japanese casualties were lost at sea, so this extraordinary "large-scale troop movement" was ended by "returning", and peace with the Qing court remained. Lee was the special envoy to Jeju in Korea at the time. He wrote "Questions and Answers of the Pyoren" based on his personal interrogation of Zeng Sheng and other Ming survivors. The book is now in the Tenri Library of Japan, in the 1982 "Minutes of the East-West Academic Research Institute of Kansai University" No. The fifteenth volume includes the full text of the book with photocopied photos. The historical data of Zeng Sheng's above-mentioned confession are absolutely reliable.
Who have you defeated? He is a native of Fujian, born in the fourth year of Chongzhen in the Ming Dynasty, and grew up in the turbulent years of the Ming and Qing Dynasties. According to Korean historical records, in June of the sixth year of Emperor Kangxi of the Qing Dynasty, that is, in June of the eighth year of Emperor Xianzong of the Li Dynasty, North Korean local officials reported: "A Tang ship was drifting in (Ji)zhou, and the ship was broken into pieces, and all the things it carried sank. Not many. There are ninety-five people here, but none of them have their heads shaved. Looking at their clothes and listening to their words, it is obvious that Lin Yinguan, the leader of them, asked them where they live and where they are. Therefore, officials and merchants from Fujian Province in the Ming Dynasty would sell goods to Japanese traders, and the wind in the ocean caused this cloud." The leaders of these 95 people were Lin Yinguan, Zeng Sheng, and Chen De. According to Korean historical records, Li Chao's translator asked a question, and Lin Yinguan and others answered that "it belongs to the vassal king and Zheng Jing", which fully proves that these 95 people are officials and businessmen of the Zheng family in Taiwan. They set out from Taiwan on May 10th of that year. Unexpectedly, they encountered strong winds in the ocean. When they drifted to Jeju Island on the 23rd, the hull of the ship was broken and they were taken in by North Korea. Zeng Sheng’s identity became clear, so why did he reveal the true historical truth only seven years after the “Japanese massive military campaign”?
First, let’s take a look at the background of the 95 people headed by Lin Yintuan, Zeng Sheng, and Chen De who went to Nagasaki this time. According to "Piaoren Q&A", Lin Yintuan was quoted as saying, "At the end of April this year, the Qing Dynasty sent an envoy named Confucius named Meng. "Zhang, the four civil and military officials of the Communist Party of China want to negotiate peace with our vassal. And our vassal wants to inform the (Japanese) monarch, Yin and others want to take advantage of the situation and send this book in advance, Yin and others don't know what to do next." "Confucius's name is Meng Zhang", the two words "Meng" and "Yuan" have the same meaning, so people at that time also called him Kong Yuanzhang. Kong Yuanzhang went to Taiwan in the spring of the sixth year of Kangxi's reign. In November of the same year, Shi Lang, the admiral of the Fujian Navy of the Qing Dynasty, stated in "Border Troubles Yijingshu" that "Commander Kong Yuanzhang returned to support him", which shows that Lin Yinguan quoted Lin Yinguan as saying that "at the end of April this year" Kong Yuanzhang "wanted to be with me" The information about the feudal peace talks is reliable. "This book was sent in advance" means that Zheng Jing's letter to the King of Japan was handed over to Lin Yintuan, Zeng Sheng and others before his eastward journey, that is, before the tenth day of May. It was broken and "lost in the sinking time", but Cai Zheng's three letters to the survivors in Riming still exist and are available to the DPRK for reading. Obviously, "lost in the sinking time" is an excuse for confidentiality. However, in responding to North Korea's inquiries, Lin Yinguan and others still revealed the secrets of asking for Zheng Tai's silver deposits in Nagasaki and "gathering troops and horses", which left the North Korean side with the impression that "there was a Japanese document requesting troops during the trip." It is not difficult to see that when Kong Yuanzhang went to Taiwan to negotiate peace, Zheng Jingzheng was seeking to borrow troops from Japan. At that time, Li's Korea had diplomatic relations with the Qing Dynasty, so the DPRK was very sensitive to Zheng's begging for troops from Japan and was careful. When Lin Yinguan answered, he said by the way, "The king of Japan promised to help with troops the year before last" and "The former king has borrowed troops from Japan for a long time." , and Zeng Sheng couldn't help but tell the historical secret of "Japan launched a large-scale military campaign in the early Gengzi summer".
Its attitude was very cautious. The so-called indifference did not mean that it was unwilling to send troops. Moreover, at that time, Japan still had "quite the ambition to manage China." However, because this matter related to the relationship between the two countries with the Qing court, it had to be weighed. The evolution of wars in the Ming and Qing Dynasties and their gains and losses should be treated with caution.
For example, in the second year of Emperor Longwu's reign in the Southern Ming Dynasty, Zheng Zhilong sent envoys to beg for soldiers. According to the fourth chapter of Kurita Genjiro's "Modern History of Japan", the Tokugawa shogunate "was ashamed to refuse, and the vassals of Kishu, Oishu, and Mito even wanted to serve as generals." "It was only with the news of Zheng Zhilong's surrender to the Qing Dynasty and the death of Long Wu that the dispatch of troops came to nothing. Combined with the struggle situation in the Ming and Qing Dynasties at that time, it is not difficult to see that "Japan's large-scale military deployment in the early Gengzi summer" was decided after careful consideration by the Tokugawa shogunate. Zheng Chenggong sent Guiwu and Monk Ruxi to beg for troops in Japan. At that time, Yongli Li Dingguo had made an agreement with Zheng Chenggong for the Northern Expedition. Li Dingguo also agreed that Li Laiheng would cooperate with Zheng Chenggong in Hubei for the Northern Expedition. Wei Geng and others actively moved in the middle and lower reaches of the Yangtze River to welcome the Northern Expedition. From a certain In this sense, Zheng Chenggong's Northern Expedition in the 12th year of Yongli in the Southern Ming Dynasty, that is, in the 16th year of Shunzhi in the Qing Dynasty, was a decisive battle related to the fate of both the Ming and Qing Dynasties, and whether the Qing court could achieve unification. Zheng Chenggong was well aware of the important strategic significance of this move, so before the Northern Expedition he actively trained troops in Xiamen, raised enough military pay, sent Gui Wu and others to Japan to beg for soldiers, joined forces with Zhang Huangyan, and invited overseas survivors such as Zhu Shunshui to return to China to participate in the war, which showed that he attached great importance to the Northern Expedition. Full of confidence in victory, he said in his letter to Tokugawa Ietsuna, "Zhongxing Yier". This extraordinary plan to restore sight attracted Japan's attention. The three feudal lords of Owari, Kii, and Mito all advocated sending troops, which had a great influence on the Tokugawa shogunate's decision-making. After more than a year of preparation, the "Gengzi" was finally announced. In the early summer of Gengzi, Japan mobilized a large number of troops to follow the Japanese guests in Japan Those who want to go to Beijing" showed that Japan hoped that the "barbarians" would change to China during the war between the Ming and Qing Dynasties. It is true that the continuous Japanese invasion during the Ming Dynasty was actually related to the long-term civil strife in Japan at that time, and had nothing to do with the Japanese rulers. The Japanese rulers in the Ming Dynasty never sent troops to China, and this "Japanese large-scale troop movement" although it was during Zheng Chenggong's Northern Expedition After being defeated and encountering a storm on the way, they "returned". This had no actual strategic impact on the war between the Ming and Qing Dynasties, nor did it have a negative impact on complicating Sino-Japanese relations at that time. However, this was, after all, a historical event in the history of the Ming and Qing dynasties and the history of Sino-Japanese relations. major events.
Why are there no records in the historical records of China and Japan? Because this matter is related to the relationship between the Tokugawa shogunate and the Qing court, the issue is complicated. What's more, Japan's unilateral undeclared war is purely an absolute secret of the Tokugawa shogunate and will not be easily exposed publicly, not to mention that it has not fought with the Qing soldiers. As for the "return", the Japanese army did not land in China, so it naturally did not attract the attention of historians of the two countries. The Lee Joseon Dynasty had a special relationship with the Qing court, but the fact that 95 people including Lin Yinguan, Zeng Sheng, and Chen De were escorted back to China and brutally murdered by the Qing court shocked the Lee Joseon Dynasty, so they were particularly cautious in dealing with the Ming Dynasty survivors in the future. Although the Li family knew about this matter from Zeng Sheng's confession, the Li family had a history with the Ming Dynasty and did not forget their kindness in aiding the DPRK to fight against the Japanese in the Renchen year of Wanli Dynasty, so they did not publicize this matter. It can only be seen in the private record "Piao Ren" The few phrases in "Questions and Answers" are not easily discovered by Chinese and Japanese historians. However, Zheng Chenggong's statement on the Northern Expedition stated that he would "unexpectedly meet with 14 overseas countries", which revealed that Japan was about to send troops. Japan is known as one of the dozens of small countries. The Tokugawa shogunate controlled the vassals and unified Japan. Therefore, Zheng Chenggong's "fourteen overseas countries" actually refers to Japan, and the "unexpected meeting" indicates that the Tokugawa shogunate and Zheng Chenggong sent troops to Japan. There is a tacit understanding on the matter. It is worth noting that the Japanese dispatch of troops was officially mentioned in the diplomatic activities between the Tokugawa shogunate and Zheng Chenggong not long after. For example, in July of the 14th year of Yongli, Zheng Chenggong ordered the chief military officer Zhang Guangqi to go to Japan to beg for soldiers. Zhang Guangqi replied in the month that the Tokugawa shogunate "resolutely refused to accept the losses caused by sending troops before." "Loss of troops sent out before", that is, Zeng Sheng's confession said that "in the early summer of Gengzi, Japan mobilized its troops in large numbers" and "there was a sudden strong wind in the ocean and the boat could not move forward." Many Japanese soldiers died in shipwrecks, which became the "firm will of the Tokugawa shogunate" The superficial reason of "no" can also prove that Zhang Guangqi's mission to Japan took place several months after Japan sent troops.
Why did the Tokugawa shogunate have inconsistent attitudes towards Zheng Chenggong’s begging for troops? The reason can be seen by looking at the background at that time. Originally, the situation in the early stages of Zheng Chenggong's Northern Expedition was good. "The response from all parties was called ZTE." The people in the Sanwu area hoped that Zheng Chenggong's Northern Expedition would be successful. At that time, the Qing army was at a disadvantage, Jiangning was about to fall, and the whole country was shocked. The Qing government "wanted to send troops from the capital" to assist Jiangning. However, at this critical moment, Zheng Chenggong made serious mistakes of being arrogant and underestimating the enemy. For example, he surrounded Jiangning without attacking, his military discipline was lax, and he did not seize Jiangning's choke points. This allowed the Qing government to mobilize troops from the coast to reinforce the Jiangning defenders and strengthen the Qing army's strength. , and later the tactics were inappropriate. For example, after the defeat in the peripheral battle of Jiangning, they sailed away from Zhenjiang and missed the opportunity to turn passivity into initiative. The Northern Expedition ultimately failed due to Zheng Chenggong. The failure of the Northern Expedition adversely affected the remaining troops of Li Laiheng, Liu Tichun, and Hao Yongzhong. They were unable to open up a situation in Jingzhou and Xiangyang, Hubei Province, and "settled the west mountain of Wushan Badong", which meant that the last hope of Nanming's restoration of the Ming Dynasty was shattered. It is not difficult to see that the Japanese sent troops to the sea and encountered strong winds and returned. The Tokugawa shogunate had learned that Zheng Chenggong's military strength was severely weakened after the defeat of the Northern Expedition. The Yongli Dynasty was about to perish. The Qing Dynasty basically controlled the inland of the country. The Tokugawa shogunate had no hope of restoring the Ming Dynasty in the south. If we have hope, how can we ignore the relationship between China and Japan and send troops again, willing to complicate the conflict with the Qing court and take the risk of inevitable failure? Therefore, Zhang Guangqi's mission to Japan on Zheng Chenggong's order was doomed to fail.
In short, Zeng Sheng’s confession deserves the attention of the history circles of China and Japan. Of course, the study of history cannot be separated from historical materials, nor can it blindly rely on historical materials. The key is to search extensively and eliminate falsehoods while retaining the truth. Zeng Sheng's confession can make up for the deficiencies in the historical records of China and Japan, and enrich the history of the Ming and Qing dynasties and the history of Sino-Japanese relations regarding Japan's dispatch of troops at Zheng Chenggong's request. If the opinions in this article are inappropriate, historians from China and Japan are welcome to correct them.